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ARTICLE
MARYLAND’S MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAW:
TRANSACTIONAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR
REAL ESTATE PRACTITIONERS
Nicole M. Lacoste Folks, Lawrence F. Haislip
and Matthew L. Kimball1
The congruence between Federal and state laws relating to mari-
juana,2 which has existed for generations, is unraveling. In recent
years a number of states have reduced or eliminated criminal penal-
ties for the possession or use of small amounts of marijuana;3 twenty-
three states have established a state law exception for medical mari-
juana;4 and Colorado, Washington, Alaska and Oregon now authorize
the retail and personal growth, sale and possession of marijuana as a
matter of state law.5 Maryland has lately joined the list of states pur-
porting to create exceptions or safe harbors for those wishing to en-
gage in the manufacture, distribution and use of so-called “medical
marijuana.”6 Yet Congress’s operative expression of the federal legisla-
tive intent on this topic remains as it was first embodied in the Con-
trolled Substances Act (“CSA”),7 which was originally enacted as Title
1. Ms. Folks is a principal of The Law Office of Nicole M. Folks, in Baltimore,
Maryland; Mr. Haislip is a principal at Miles & Stockbridge P.C., in
Baltimore, Maryland; and Mr. Kimball is a partner at Niles, Barton &
Wilmer, LLP, in Baltimore, Maryland.
2. In this article the terms “marijuana” and “cannabis” are used interchangea-
bly. Cannabis is commonly used in three forms: marijuana, hashish and
hash oil. Cannabis comes from the cannabis plant and marijuana is made
from the dried flowers and leaves of the cannabis plant. Learn About Mari-
juana, UNIV. OF WASH., http://learnaboutmarijuanawa.org/factsheets/
whatiscannabis.htm#sthash.iNhjHEol.dpuf. (last visited Sep. 9, 2016).
3. E.g., California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Ohio, Vermont. The Marijuana Policy Project provides a map illustrating
the status of state marijuana laws. State Policy, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT
https://www.mpp.org/states/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2016)/.
4. E.g., Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Vermont, Washington. Id.
5. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Prof. & Occ. §§ 12-43.3-101-12-43.3-1102 (2016);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann., Food, Drugs, Cosm., & Pois. §§ 69-50.325 - 69-50.369
(2016); Alaska Stat., Rev. & Tax. §§17.8.010–17.38.900; 43.61.010–
43.61.030; Measure 91, (Or. 2016).
6. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. §§ 13-3301-13-3316 (2016).
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq.
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II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970.8 This divergence in approach has created fissures in the legal
landscape which pose serious traps for unwary Maryland real property
owners, landlords and tenants who would engage in medical mari-
juana-related activities, as well as for the attorneys who are called upon
to advise them. This article will examine some of those transactional
and ethical issues.
Federal and State Laws – Divergent Paths
The Federal Approach
The Congress of the United States has regulated drugs, chemicals,
plants and other products which are now classified as “controlled sub-
stances” for over one hundred years.9 The CSA—the current embodi-
ment of the Federal criminal and regulatory approach—was passed in
order to federally regulate and facilitate the manufacture, distribu-
tion, and use of controlled substances for legitimate medical, scien-
tific, research, and industrial purposes, and to prevent these
substances from being diverted for illegal purposes.
The CSA places various plants, drugs, and chemicals (such as nar-
cotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids)
into one of five schedules based on the substance’s medical use,
potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Marijuana (in-
cluding substances containing its active ingredient, tetrahydrocanna-
binol) is classified as a “Schedule I” controlled substance. Substances
classified in Schedule I are deemed to have “a high potential for
abuse” with “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States” and lack “accepted safety for use of the drug under
medical supervisions.”10 So under the CSA such substances may not be
dispensed under a prescription, and such substances may be used only
for bona fide, federal government-approved research studies.11
Persons who manufacture, distribute, import, or possess controlled
substances in violation of the CSA commit a federal crime, and are
subject to significant civil and criminal penalties. Since marijuana is
classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, CSA violations with re-
spect to marijuana are subject to the most severe penalties imposable
under that act. The mere possession of marijuana generally consti-
tutes a misdemeanor subject to up to one year imprisonment and a
minimum fine of $1,000.12 A violation of the federal “simple posses-
sion” statute that occurs after a single prior conviction under any fed-
8. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
9. E.g., The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
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eral or state drug law triggers a mandatory minimum fine of $2,500
and a minimum imprisonment term of 15 days (up to a maximum of
two years); and if the defendant has had multiple prior drug offense
convictions at the time of his or her federal simple possession offense,
then the sentencing court must impose a mandatory minimum fine of
$5,000 and a mandatory minimum imprisonment term of 90 days (up
to a maximum term of three years).13 Furthermore, a person who cul-
tivates or distributes marijuana, or who possesses it with the intent to
distribute it, is subject to even more severe penalties – including the
risk of imprisonment for a term of from five years to life.14 Moreover,
any property associated with the offense may be confiscated – regard-
less of any prior or accompanying criminal conviction.15
As a matter of fact, the CSA contains both civil16 as well as criminal
forfeiture provisions for violations of the act, and in a given case the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) may choose to seek civil forfeiture
remedies either in addition to, or in lieu of, criminal prosecution.
Conceivably civil forfeiture proceedings could be used more exten-
sively by DOJ in order to disrupt marijuana growers, processors and
dispensers operating under various state regulatory schemes which at-
tempt to de-criminalize marijuana production and distribution under
state laws, discussed below.
Civil forfeiture under the CSA is conducted through in rem proceed-
ings: the property itself is treated as the “offender,” and the govern-
ment need not proffer any criminal charges against the owner,
landlord, tenant, mortgagee or other lienholder with respect to the
property, since mens rea is not at issue: the only relevant inquiry is
whether the property was used in, or otherwise connected to, any ac-
tivity in violation of the CSA. Moreover, “property” subject to forfei-
ture for CSA violations includes not only the actual physical property
(real or personal) used in connection with the violation, but also the
direct and indirect proceeds of the violative acts themselves.17 Obvi-
ously, the property most likely to be subject to seizure and forfeiture
in the first instance is the controlled substance itself, which has been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, acquired, or possessed in viola-
tion of the CSA. But the government’s net will spread wide enough to
capture any and all real or personal property, or interests therein, or
furniture, fixtures, machinery and equipment, or money or cash
equivalents, accounts or other financial assets which have been used
or intended to be used in connection with a CSA violation. Moreover,
in such a civil forfeiture proceeding the government need only prove
13. Id.
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 848(a).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 853.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
17. Id.
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the elements of its case by a preponderance of the evidence.18 In any
such case the government will destroy any controlled substances
which it seizes, and sell all other seized property at public auction, in
which case the proceeds of sale, net of expenses, will be forwarded to
an Asset Forfeiture Fund established by DOJ.19
Although courts have recognized an “innocent owner” exception to
the forfeiture rules, an owner is not an innocent owner where it is
reasonable to believe that the owner of the property to be forfeited is
aware that the property is the proceeds of narcotics transactions, or
that it was somehow used in connection with, or otherwise involved in
narcotics exchange business.20
The common, garden-variety anti-conspiracy and aiding and abet-
ting laws also exist within the Federal criminal arsenal, for use against
would-be violators of the CSA. To prove a conspiracy to commit of-
fenses against the United States21 the government need only establish
three simple elements beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the de-
fendant entered into an agreement to commit an unlawful act; sec-
ond, that the defendant had knowledge of the agreement and
voluntarily participated in it; and third, that at least one of the co-
conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The government must prove that the defendant had both the intent
to agree and the intent to commit the substantive offense.22 Provided
that these elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a defen-
dant may be held indirectly responsible as an aider and abettor if he
associated himself with the venture, participated in it as something
that he wanted to bring about, or sought by his actions to make the
venture succeed. It is settled that a culpable aider and abettor need
not perform the substantive offense, be present when it is performed,
or be aware of the details of its execution.23  Furthermore, a corpora-
tion may be held liable for the criminal acts of its agents so long as
those agents are acting within the scope of employment. Typically, the
test is whether the agent is performing acts of the kind which he is
authorized to perform, and those acts are motivated—at least in
part—by intent to benefit the corporation.24
So, for example, by application of these statutes and principles a
landlord who knowingly leases commercial space to a participant in a
state-sponsored or licensed marijuana-related enterprise is neverthe-
less liable to independent prosecution under federal law, as an aider
and abettor, if not as a co-conspirator, to the operating enterprise,
18. 18 U.S.C. § 981(b).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e).
20. U.S. v. Four Million Two Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand, Six Hundred and
Twenty-Five Dollars and Thirty-Nine Cents, 551 F.Supp. 314 (D.C.Fla., 1982).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 371.
22. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541 (1st Cir. 2010).
23. Id. at 552.
24. Id. at 552-53.
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which operates in violation of the CSA. Typically, the same penalties
apply to persons who conspire to do so, or who aid and abet others in
so doing.25
Maryland’s Medical Marijuana Laws
Most states have enacted anti-drug statutes modeled on the CSA.
Maryland’s anti-drug statute is not dissimilar to the laws enacted in
other states, and is generally congruent with the CSA: under Maryland
law, the possession or administration to another of a controlled dan-
gerous substance is prohibited unless obtained from an authorized
provider acting in the course of professional practice.26
However, under Maryland laws enacted in the 2013,27 2014 and
2015 sessions of the Maryland General Assembly28 (such statutes, to-
gether with accompanying regulations published in COMAR,29 being
collectively referred to as the “Maryland Medical Marijuana Laws” or
the “MMM Laws”) an exemption has been provided from arrest, pros-
ecution, or any civil or administrative penalty, or the denial of any
right or privilege,30 for licensees regarding the medical use of “Medi-
cal Cannabis,” including “Medical Cannabis Concentrate,” “Medical
Cannabis Finished Product” or “Medical Cannabis Infused
Products.”31
On September 28, 2015, the Maryland Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene Natalie M. LaPrade Maryland Medical Cannabis Com-
mission (the “Commission”)32 published its forms for applications for
Medical Cannabis grower, processor and dispensary licenses, with the
stated intent to seek applications from qualified applicants interested
in receiving such licenses. Under the MMM Laws, the Commission
can award a maximum of fifteen grower licenses, an unlimited num-
25. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982.
26. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 5-101–5-1101; § 5-601 (2016).
27. The current law is not Maryland’s first venture into the legalization of medi-
cal cannabis.  In 2013, the State legislature approved a prior version of this
law that limited distribution of medical cannabis to academic medical cen-
ters and only to patients with a debilitating illness.  No application for con-
sideration was submitted by any academic institution eligible under the
prior version of this law so that lack of participation amongst the academic
world set the stage for the current version of the law that opens licenses for
the growing, processing, and dispensing of medical cannabis to private ap-
plicants not related in any way to an academic institution.
28. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. §§13-3301–13-3316 (2016).
29. MD CODE REGS. §§10.62.01-10.62-35.
30. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 13-3313.
31. MD CODE REGS. §§10.62.01-10.62-35.
32. The Commission is named after Natalie M. LaPrade, the late mother of
State Delegate Cheryl D. Glenn, who died of kidney cancer in 2011. Dele-
gate Glenn was a lead sponsor of the State’s medical cannabis legislation.
See Timothy B. Wheeler, Medical Marijuana Fees Stir Debate in Maryland, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ma
ryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-medical-marijuana-fees-20141011-story.html.
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ber of processor licenses and up to two dispensary licenses in each of
the state’s senatorial districts (that is to say, ninety-four dispensary li-
censes in total).
The deadline for submission of applications was November 6, 2015,
and so-called “Stage-One” awards were to have been made by mid-
January 2016. But on December 21, 2015, the Commission announced
that it had received 146 grower license applications, 124 processor li-
cense applications and 811 dispensary license applications and that, in
response to the overwhelming number of applications received, the
Commission revised its schedule and stated that it anticipated issuing
Stage-One awards for grower and processor applicants by summer
2016. The revised schedule for the issuance of Stage-One approval of
dispensary applicants was stated to be announced “in the near
future.”33
The Commission’s grower, processor and dispensary license appli-
cation process serves to highlight the incongruity which now exists,
between federal law, on the one hand, and under Maryland and other
similar state laws, on the other, in respect of the growth, manufacture,
sale, possession and use of “Medical Cannabis.” It also points to the
inherent – and as of this date irreducible – risks which must be borne
by any persons who choose to engage in commercial Medical Canna-
bis activities, in reliance upon the protections and approvals obtained
under the MMM Laws. Although the Commission proposes to act in
accordance with state statute—the MMM Law—it is unclear how any
applicant can accept a license, as a “Licensed Grower,” and construct
and operate a facility to produce and distribute “Medical Cannabis,”
including “Medical Cannabis Concentrate,” “Medical Cannabis Fin-
ished Product” or “Medical Cannabis Infused Products” under the
MMM Law34 without violating federal statutes, e.g., the CSA.
One will look in vain for any exception or safe harbor for such activ-
ities under the CSA, and at any rate the Commission itself does not
appear to think that one exists. For example, in certification 9, which
appears at page 33 of the Commission’s Application for a Grower Li-
cense, the applicant is asked to acknowledge that the applicant “fully
understands” that “Cannabis is a Schedule I controlled substance
under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.);
Manufacture, distribution, cultivation, processing, possession, or pos-
session with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance, or
conspiring or attempting to do so, are offenses subject to harsh penal-
ties under federal law and could result in arrest, prosecution, convic-
tion, incarceration, fine, seizure of property, and loss of licenses or
other privileges:. . . .”35
33. MD CODE REGS. §§10.62.01-10.62.35.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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One can only presume that this is the Commission’s way of making
sure that each applicant for a Grower License proceeds with his eyes
open. That is to say, each applicant is obliged to certify to the Com-
mission that the applicant understands that while the growth, process-
ing, distribution and dispensation of cannabis may be done in
accordance with Maryland law, each of these activities remains an in-
dependent violation of long-standing federal law; that these activities
are all federal crimes; and that they will remain federal crimes even if
the state has decriminalized these activities.
Federal and State Responses to the Problems Posed by the Conflict in
Laws
Preemption – Or Not
Generally speaking, Congress has the power under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution “to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”36
Defendants subject to prosecution under the CSA have used the Com-
merce Clause offensively, to argue that the CSA, when applied to
purely intrastate commercial activity, is an impermissible extension of
federal power into an area reserved to the states, but such arguments
have been unavailing.  For example, in Gonzales v. Raich,37 the U.S.
Supreme Court specifically found that, with respect to the prosecution
of activity that was legal under California’s medical marijuana laws,
the regulation of marijuana under the CSA was squarely within Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause, because production of
marijuana meant for home consumption had a substantial effect on
supply and demand in the national market. Citing the enforcement
difficulties in distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and
marijuana grown elsewhere, and concerns about diversion into illicit
channels, the Court concluded that Congress had a rational basis for
believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and pos-
session of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.
Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution38 dic-
tates that, to the extent that federal laws conflict with state laws, fed-
eral laws are understood to control, or to “preempt” state laws. The
extent to which a federal law shall operate preemptively is a matter
generally vested within the discretion of the Congress, when it acts
within the scope of its enumerated powers under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. In some cases, Congress exercises its powers so pervasively that it
36. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
37. 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[T]he laws of the United States [. . .] shall be
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.”).
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precludes any state activity on the same matter. The immigration laws
provide a topical example of such an instance.39 In other cases, Con-
gress has elected to share the legislative field with the states, and in
such cases state laws may be given effect unless, and to the extent that,
they conflict with federal law in one of two ways: first, if it is “physically
impossible” to comply with both the state and federal law (“impossibil-
ity preemption”); or second, if the state law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress” (“obstacle preemption”).40
What constitutes an obstacle for preemption purposes is a matter
“to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and iden-
tifying its purpose and intended effects.”41 When Congress acts within
an area traditionally within the purview of the states, it will be assumed
not to have intended to give its words preemptive force unless a con-
trary purpose is manifestly clear.42
Despite this well-settled interpretation of the relationship between
conflicting federal and state laws, it is not entirely clear how courts will
resolve conflicts between the CSA and state laws legalizing or
decriminalizing medical marijuana. The problem is made all the more
difficult because the CSA itself contains a clear expression of federal
intent not to completely pre-empt state legislative action in respect of
the regulation of controlled substances.43
The extent to which there is a positive conflict between the CSA
and a particular state’s medical marijuana laws has already been the
subject of much debate. The Supreme Court of Oregon has found
that the CSA preempted the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act to extent
that the state law affirmatively authorized medical marijuana use, and
that the state law was not permitted under 21 USCS § 903 to extent
that it authorizes persons holding medical marijuana licenses to en-
gage in conduct that the CSA explicitly prohibits.44  However, the Su-
preme Court of Michigan held that no conflict existed between the
CSA and applicable provisions of the Michigan Medical Marihuana
Act, as it was “not impossible” to comply with both CSA’s federal pro-
hibition of marijuana and the Michigan act’s limited state-law immu-
39. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).
40. See Hillman v. Maretta, 13 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013); see also Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005).
41. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 at 2501.
42. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (“No provision of [the CSA] shall be construed as indicat-
ing an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any
State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provi-
sion of this title and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand
together.”).
44. Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v Bureau of Labor & Indus., 348 Or. 159, 230
P.3d 518 (2010).
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nity for certain medical marijuana use, and the Michigan act did not
stand as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of the CSA.45
Similar results have been reached in cases in Colorado46 and
California.47
Legal scholars and commentators have suggested a novel resolution
to this apparent conflict, which has been viewed favorably by some
courts.  For example, Professor Robert A. Mikos, of Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Law School, has stated that “states retain both de jure and de facto
power to exempt medical marijuana from criminal sanctions, in spite
of Congress’s uncompromising—and clearly constitutional—ban on
the drug. States may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress
is unable to preempt state laws that merely permit (i.e., that refuse to
punish) private conduct the federal government deems objectiona-
ble.”48  Mikos goes on to argue that “as long as states go no further
[than passive legalization] — and do not actively assist marijuana
users, growers, and so on — they may continue to look the other way
when their citizens defy federal law.” As a result, “[t]he federal ban
may be strict — and its penalties severe — but without the whole-
hearted cooperation of state law enforcement authorities, its impact
on private behavior will remain limited. Most medical marijuana users
and suppliers can feel confident they will never be caught by the fed-
eral government.”49
The Mikos argument was cited with approval in In re Arenas,50 a
bankruptcy proceeding involving assets used in a medical marijuana
business legal under Colorado law. The bankruptcy judge interpreted
Prof. Mikos’s analysis thusly:
He does not suggest that state legalization somehow nullifies
federal law and prevents federal enforcement of the CSA
within state borders. To the contrary, he frankly recognizes
that marijuana production and distribution continue to be
federal crimes even in those states that have legalized those
activities. State legalization works, in his view, only because it
is the states that have been on the forefront of enforcement
of marijuana laws. Once the states decriminalize marijuana
and stop enforcing a prohibition on its distribution and use,
the federal government lacks the resources to fill that void.51
45. Beek v. City of Wyo., 495 Mich. 1, 846 N.W.2d 531 (2014).
46. People v. Crouse, 2013 Colo. App. LEXIS 1971 (2013).
47. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal.App. 4th 798 (2008).
48. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009).
49. Id.
50. In re Arenas, 514 B.R. 887 (Bankr. D. Colo., Tallman, J., 2014).
51. Id. at 890.
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The Justice Department Memoranda
DOJ exercises broad discretion in the prosecution of violations of
the CSA. Given the long-standing and well-established proscription of
marijuana cultivation, processing, use and sale, as embodied in the
CSA, and the “growing” divergence from that approach as evidenced
by the various state legalization statutes, DOJ has been asked to de-
velop policies and guidelines to aid federal officials in the exercise of
their prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the CSA. Since 2009 DOJ
has promulgated four memoranda (collectively, the “DOJ Memo-
randa”) which represent the official response from the administration
of President Obama (the “Obama Administration”) to the divergent
federal-state positions in respect of marijuana activities.
In the first of these, a memorandum to selected U. S. Attorneys
dated October 19, 2009 (the “Ogden Memorandum”)52, Deputy Attor-
ney General David W. Ogden provided guidance to federal prosecu-
tors in states that have authorized the use of medical marijuana, in
which he advised that while the prosecution of “significant traffickers
of illegal drugs, including marijuana,”53 remained a priority of DOJ,
federal prosecutors should not focus federal resources on individuals
whose actions are in “clear and unambiguous compliance with ex-
isting state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”54 Ogden
was at pains to emphasize that the guidance should not be read to
preclude investigation or prosecution, even in cases involving activities
which otherwise complied with existing state law, but in spite of this
reservation the Ogden Memorandum was widely considered to have
established just such a safe harbor exception to federal CSA enforce-
ment activity.
In the two years following the promulgation of the Ogden Memo-
randum it became increasingly clear that the vast majority of “medi-
cal” marijuana was being distributed not to the legitimately old and
sick, but rather to youthful recreational users, and that several states
had frankly adopted laws authorizing large-scale commercial mari-
juana cultivation and distribution facilities. In response, by Memoran-
dum dated June 29, 2011 (the “2011 Cole Memorandum”),55 Deputy
Attorney General James M. Cole drew a distinction between the po-
tential prosecutions of individual patients who require marijuana in
52. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., INVESTIGA-
TIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MA-




55.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDANCE
REGARDING THE OGDEN MEMO IN JURISDICTIONS SEEKING TO AUTHORIZE MA-
RIJUANA FOR MEDICAL USE (2011), available at https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical
-marijuana-use.pdf.
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the course of medical treatment and “commercial” dispensaries, stat-
ing “[t]he Ogden memorandum was never intended to shield such
activities from federal enforcement action and prosecution, even
where those activities purport to comply with state law. Persons who
are in the business of cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana,
and those who knowingly facilitate such activities, are in violation of
the [CSA] regardless of state law. Consistent with resource constraints
and the discretion you may exercise in your district, such persons are
subject to federal enforcement action, including potential
prosecution.”56
Following the enactment of laws in Colorado and Washington, le-
galizing wide-spread and large-scale growing and distribution facili-
ties, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole responded on behalf of
the Obama Administration and DOJ by issuing a further memoran-
dum dated August 29, 2013 (the “2013 Cole Memorandum”),57 to
provide guidance to all U.S. Attorneys in their exercise of investigative
and prosecutorial discretion in respect of civil and criminal enforce-
ment of the CSA. In essence, the 2013 Cole Memorandum stated
DOJ’s decision that it would not challenge jurisdictions that authorize
intra-state marijuana growth, distribution sale and use so long as those
state and local statutory schemes embodied “strong and effective” reg-
ulatory and enforcement controls on marijuana cultivation, distribu-
tion, sale, and possession that limit the risks to “public safety, public
health, and other law enforcement interests.”58
The 2013 Cole Memorandum instructed federal prosecutors to pri-
oritize their “limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to ad-
dress the most significant [marijuana-related] threats” and identified
the following “enforcement priorities that are particularly important
to the federal government”: (i) Preventing the distribution of mari-
juana to minors; (ii) Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana
from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (iii) Preventing
the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law
in some form to other states; (iv) Preventing state-authorized mari-
juana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking
of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; (v) Preventing violence
and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of mari-
juana; (vi) Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
(vii) Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by mari-
56. Id. at 2.
57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDANCE
REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (2013), available at https://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
58. Id.
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juana production on public lands; and (viii) Preventing marijuana
possession or use on federal property.59
The 2013 Cole Memorandum observed that the traditional or his-
torical congruence between federal and state drug laws, and their en-
forcement, had been undermined by the passage of laws in the several
states that endeavored to authorize marijuana production, distribu-
tion and possession by establishing regulatory schemes for these pur-
poses. Given this, DOJ’s guidance was predicated on its expectation
that “states and local governments that have enacted laws authorizing
marijuana-related conduct will implement strong and effective regula-
tory and enforcement systems that will address the threat those state
laws could pose to public safety, public health, and other law enforce-
ment interests. A system adequate to that task must not only contain
robust controls and procedures on paper; it must also be effective in
practice. Jurisdictions that have implemented systems that provide for
regulation of marijuana activity must provide the necessary resources
and demonstrate the willingness to enforce their laws and regulations
in a manner that ensures they do not undermine federal enforcement
priorities.”60 The 2013 Cole Memorandum concluded on this point by
issuing the following warning: “If state enforcement efforts are not
sufficiently robust to protect against the harms set forth above, the
federal government may seek to challenge the regulatory structure it-
self in addition to continuing to bring individual enforcement actions,
including criminal prosecutions, focused on those harms.”61
Turning to the implications of states’ licensure of large-scale cultiva-
tion and distribution operations, the 2013 Cole Memorandum re-
ferred to DOJ’s previous guidance, and modified it, to the effect that
the size of such operations, standing alone, would no longer be read
to implicate a compelling federal interest mandating federal enforce-
ment. According to the 2013 Cole Memorandum, “in exercising
prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors should not consider the size or
commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone as a proxy for as-
sessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the Department’s en-
forcement priorities listed above. Rather, prosecutors should continue
to review marijuana cases on a case-by-case basis and weigh all availa-
ble information and evidence, including, but not limited to, whether
the operation is demonstrably in compliance with a strong and effec-
tive state regulatory system. A marijuana operation’s large-scale or for-
profit nature may be a relevant consideration for assessing the extent
to which it undermines a particular federal enforcement priority. The
primary question in all cases — and in all jurisdictions — should be
59. Id. at 1-2.
60. Id. at 2-3.
61. Id. at 3.
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whether the conduct at issue implicates one or more of the enforce-
ment priorities listed above.”62
The 2013 Cole Memorandum, like its predecessors, concluded with
the following caveat:
As with the Department’s previous statements on this sub-
ject, this memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the
exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion. This
memorandum does not alter in any way the Department’s
authority to enforce federal law, including federal laws relat-
ing to marijuana, regardless of state law. Neither the gui-
dance herein nor any state or local law provides a legal
defense to a violation of federal law, including any civil or
criminal violation of the CSA. Even in jurisdictions with
strong and effective regulatory systems, evidence that partic-
ular conduct threatens federal priorities will subject that per-
son or entity to federal enforcement action, based on the
circumstances. This memorandum is not intended to, does
not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, sub-
stantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
matter civil or criminal. It applies prospectively to the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion in future cases and does not
provide defendants or subjects of enforcement action with a
basis for reconsideration of any pending civil action or crimi-
nal prosecution. Finally, nothing herein precludes investiga-
tion or prosecution, even in the absence of any one of the
factors listed above, in particular circumstances where inves-
tigation and prosecution otherwise serves an important fed-
eral interest.63
The 2013 Cole Memorandum made no reference to the application
of various federal money-laundering or banking or other financial
regulatory statutes that were implicated by marijuana-related activities
and that—apart from the CSA—have made it increasingly difficult for
marijuana-related businesses to become established and to function.
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole responded on behalf of the
Obama Administration and DOJ by issuing a further memorandum
dated February 14, 2014 (the “2014 Cole Memorandum”) on this
topic. It cited the same federal enforcement priorities and rationale
for the application of prosecutorial discretion in the allocation of
prosecutorial resources with respect to marijuana-related violations of
federal money laundering, money transfer and related statutes, partic-
ularly the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, as amended (the “BSA”).64
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4.
64. 31 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
98 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 5
The FinCEN Guidance
The federal banking laws have been specifically designed to pro-
hibit access to national and state banking systems by persons engaged
in activities involving controlled substances and in violation of the
CSA. In fact, through mandated transactional record-keeping and re-
porting requirements, financial participants in the federal banking
system have been made to serve as active sentinels on behalf of federal
law enforcement offices and departments in the enforcement of the
CSA. As a result, participants in state-sanctioned marijuana programs
have been effectively frozen out of the banking system. Most have
been unable to open or to maintain bank accounts, to deposit the
proceeds of their operations into the banking system, or to use that
system to make customary banking transactions. Many participants
have been reduced to operating on a cash-only basis.
On February 14, 2014, in concert with the issuance of the 2014 Cole
Memorandum, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued guidance with re-
spect to marijuana-related financial crimes.65
The FinCEN Guidance acknowledges that the CSA “makes it illegal
under federal law to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana,”
and it advises banking institutions, as part of their customer due dili-
gence, to consider whether a marijuana-related business implicates
one of the 2013 Cole Memorandum priorities.66 Although purporting
to clarify how financial institutions can provide services to marijuana-
related businesses consistent with their BSA obligations, FinCEN re-
minds such institutions that, “[b]ecause federal law prohibits the dis-
tribution and sale of marijuana, financial transactions involving a
marijuana-related business would generally involve funds derived
from illegal activity,” they must file a “suspicious activity report”67
(“SAR”) on activity involving a marijuana-related business. However, a
more limited report may be filed if the institution reasonably believes
that the business does not implicate one of the Cole memorandum
priorities or violate state law.68
Banks must file SARs with FinCEN relating to any transaction involv-
ing $5,000 or more that they have reason to suspect are derived from
illegal activity and, regardless of any suspicion of illegal activity, they
must file a currency transaction report (“CTR”) with respect to any
transaction involving $10,000 or more. Willful failure to do so is pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not more than five years (not more than
65. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-
2014-G001, BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESS
(2014) [hereinafter FINCEN GUIDANCE], available at https://
www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-G001.pdf.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3.
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10 years in cases of a substantial pattern of violations or transactions
involving other illegal activity). Breaking up a transaction into two or
more transactions to avoid the reporting requirement (“structuring”)
subjects the offender to the same maximum terms of imprisonment.
Banks must also establish and maintain anti-money laundering pro-
grams, designed to ensure that bank officers and employees will have
sufficient knowledge of the banks’ customers and of the business of
those customers to identify the circumstances under which filing SARs
and CTRs is appropriate.
Banks, their officers, employees, and customers may also face crimi-
nal liability under the money laundering statutes for marijuana-re-
lated financial transactions: it is a federal crime,69 punishable by
imprisonment for up to ten years, to deposit or withdraw $10,000 or
more in proceeds derived from the distribution of marijuana and any
other controlled substances. It is also a federal crime,70 punishable for
imprisonment for up to twenty years, to engage in a financial transac-
tion involving such proceeds conducted with the intent to engage in
further offenses as, for example, by withdrawing marijuana-generated
funds in order to pay rent for the use of marijuana-operations facili-
ties, or to pay the salaries of employees engaged in marijuana-related
activities. The same penalties apply to persons who conspire to do so,
or who aid and abet others in so doing.71
The FinCEN Guidance advised financial institutions that if they pro-
vided financial services to customers operating a marijuana-related
business then they were required to file one of three special forms of
the SAR: (i) a “marijuana limited SAR” (appropriate when the bank
determines, after the exercise of due diligence, that its customer is not
engaged in any of the activities that violate state law or that would
implicate any of the eight DOJ investigation and prosecution priori-
ties listed in the 2013 Cole Memorandum and the 2014 Cole Memo-
randum); (ii) a “marijuana priority SAR” (appropriate when an
alternative determination is made); or (iii) a “marijuana termination
SAR” (if it determines that it must “fire its customer” in fulfillment of
its anti-money laundering obligations).72
FinCEN also provides examples of “red flags” that may indicate that
a marijuana priority SAR is appropriate, and it may be instructive to
reproduce these examples as presented in the FinCEN Guidance, if
only for the purpose of prompting the reader to reflect on the sheer
weight of the regulatory and administrative burdens which have been
placed on banking industry participants as they struggle to “know
their customer,” in order to comply with their BSA obligations:
69. 18 U.S.C. §1957 (2012).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2016).
71. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982.
72. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 58, at 3-5.
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• A customer appears to be using a state-licensed mari-
juana-related business as a front or pretext to launder
money derived from other criminal activity (i.e., not re-
lated to marijuana) or derived from marijuana-related ac-
tivity not permitted under state law. Relevant indicia
could include:
○ The business receives substantially more revenue than
may reasonably be expected given the relevant limita-
tions imposed by the state in which it operates.
○ The business receives substantially more revenue than
its local competitors or than might be expected given
the population demographics.
○ The business is depositing more cash than is commen-
surate with the amount of marijuana-related revenue
it is reporting for federal and state tax purposes.
○ The business is unable to demonstrate that its reve-
nue is derived exclusively from the sale of marijuana
in compliance with state law, as opposed to revenue
derived from (i) the sale of other illicit drugs, (ii) the
sale of marijuana not in compliance with state law, or
(iii) other illegal activity.
○ The business makes cash deposits or withdrawals over
a short period of time that are excessive relative to
local competitors or the expected activity of the
business.
○ Deposits apparently structured to avoid Currency
Transaction Report (“CTR”) requirements.
○ Rapid movement of funds, such as cash deposits fol-
lowed by immediate cash withdrawals.
○ Deposits by third parties with no apparent connection
to the accountholder.
○ Excessive commingling of funds with the personal ac-
count of the business’s owner(s) or manager(s), or
with accounts of seemingly unrelated businesses.
○ Individuals conducting transactions for the business
appear to be acting on behalf of other, undisclosed
parties of interest.
○ Financial statements provided by the business to the
financial institution are inconsistent with actual ac-
count activity.
○ A surge in activity by third parties offering goods or
services to marijuana-related businesses, such as
equipment suppliers or shipping servicers.
• The business is unable to produce satisfactory documen-
tation or evidence to demonstrate that it is duly licensed
and operating consistently with state law.
• The business is unable to demonstrate the legitimate
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• A customer seeks to conceal or disguise involvement in
marijuana-related business activity. For example, the cus-
tomer may be using a business with a non-descript name
(e.g., a “consulting,” “holding,” or “management” com-
pany) that purports to engage in commercial activity un-
related to marijuana, but is depositing cash that smells
like marijuana.
• Review of publicly available sources and databases about
the business, its owner(s), manager(s), or other related
parties, reveal negative information, such as a criminal re-
cord, involvement in the illegal purchase or sale of drugs,
violence, or other potential connections to illicit activity.
• The business, its owner(s), manager(s), or other related
parties are, or have been, subject to an enforcement ac-
tion by the state or local authorities responsible for ad-
ministering or enforcing marijuana-related laws or
regulations.
• A marijuana-related business engages in international or
interstate activity, including by receiving cash deposits
from locations outside the state in which the business op-
erates, making or receiving frequent or large interstate
transfers, or otherwise transacting with persons or entities
located in different states or countries.
• The owner(s) or manager(s) of a marijuana-related busi-
ness reside outside the state in which the business is
located.
• A marijuana-related business is located on federal prop-
erty or the marijuana sold by the business was grown on
federal property.
• A marijuana-related business’s proximity to a school is
not compliant with state law.
• A marijuana-related business purporting to be a “non-
profit” is engaged in commercial activity inconsistent with
that classification, or is making excessive payments to its
manager(s) or employee(s).73
The FinCEN guidance ends with the observation that a bank is not
absolved of its obligation to file a currency transaction report for any
financial transaction involving more than $10,000 in cash, regardless
of how it resolves its marijuana SAR obligations.74
Congressional Responses
In recent years a number of marijuana-related legislative proposals
have been made in the U.S. Congress, some of which have passed and
been enacted into law. For example, P.L. 113-235 §809(b), the 2015
73. Id. at 5-7.
74. Id. at 7.
102 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 5
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, was passed
in an effort to stymie the passage of the District of Columbia’s Initia-
tive 71, legalizing the recreational use of marijuana in D.C. The rele-
vant provision of the act states that “[n]one of the funds contained in
this Act may be used to enact any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or
otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or dis-
tribution of any Schedule I substance under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (21 U.S.C. 801, et seq.) or any tetrahydrocannabinols
derivative for recreational purposes.” The proponents of the act in-
tended that the provision bars the District from using FY2015 appro-
priated funds to implement Initiative 71 and that any employee who
takes official acts to implement the law could be subject to civil or
criminal liability under the Antideficiency Act, but the District govern-
ment’s position is that the act is ineffective to do that inasmuch as the
initiative was enacted into law before passage of the act.
In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, H.R.
2029, 114th Cong. § 542, Pub. L. No. 114-113 (2015), passed and
signed into law in late 2015, bars the DOJ from expending funds to
prosecute the use, possession, and sale of medical marijuana in states
that legalized medical marijuana prior to December 18, 2015.  Specifi-
cally, Section 542 of the omnibus bill prohibits the DOJ from using
FY2016 funds to block those U.S. jurisdictions that have legalized
medical marijuana from “implementing their own laws that authorize
the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical mari-
juana.”75  The language of the omnibus bill, coupled with the DOJ
Memoranda, suggests that medical marijuana businesses that are oper-
ating properly under state law are unlikely to become the targets of
federal prosecution prior to September 30, 2016.  However, there can
be no guarantee that such parties would avoid prosecution under fed-
eral law, particularly after the end of the 2016 fiscal year, or at any rate
after the Obama Administration ends on January 20, 2017.
Finally, S. 683/H.R. 1538, the so-called Compassionate Access, Re-
search Expansion, and Respect of States Act of 2015 also referred to as
the “CARERS Act”, though not yet enacted, would exempt from the
CSA “any person acting in compliance with State law relating to the
production, possession, distribution, dispensation, administration,
laboratory testing, or delivery of medical marihuana,”76 and it would
also reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II substance, meaning that ma-
rijuana would be recognized under federal law as having medical ben-
efits and could be prescribed to patients for legitimate medical
reasons in accordance with the CSA. A further provision of the CAR-
ERS Act would also expressly provide legal protections to banks and
other federally regulated depository institutions in order to permit
75. Id.
76. Id.
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them to safely provide financial services to marijuana businesses, in-
cluding by adding a provision stating that “[a] Federal banking regula-
tor may not prohibit, penalize, or otherwise discourage a depository
institution from providing financial services to a marijuana-related le-
gitimate business.” The proposed act would also lessen current BSA
reporting burdens, which have been exacerbated—or at any rate not
lessened in practice—as the result of the DOJ Memoranda and the
FinCEN Guidance.
Practical Effects of the Federal and State Responses
The 2014 Cole Memorandum and FinCEN Guidance have done lit-
tle to persuade banks and other financial participants in the U.S.
banking system to extend financial services to persons and entities en-
gaged in state-sanctioned marijuana-related activities—regardless how
tangential or attenuated those connections might be. Reports in na-
tional newspapers have confirmed banks’ prompt action to close ac-
counts, however denominated, once information of a marijuana
connection is brought to their attention.77 Other national newspapers
have reported that banks intend to refuse to renew or re-finance mort-
gage loans on commercial properties being leased or operated in ma-
rijuana-related businesses, or offer new loans secured by property in
which pre-existing marijuana-related businesses are in occupancy.
It takes very little imagination to conclude why this has occurred.
One need only conduct a simple thought experiment, applying the
FinCEN Guidance and its “red flags” to a common hypothetical bank-
ing relationship, to conclude that banking system participants have
been placed in a well-nigh impossible situation in attempting to com-
ply with their BSA obligations. For example, exactly how is a bank
officer to go about determining that a prospective marijuana-related
business customer receives “substantially more” revenue than may
“reasonably be expected” given the “relevant” limitations imposed by
the state in which it operates; or that it receives “substantially more”
revenue than its “local competitors” or than “might be expected given
the population demographics”? Or what sort of investigative force will
the bank be obliged to create and maintain in order to make—or to
negate—a determination that its customer is depositing “more cash
than is commensurate” with the amount of marijuana-related revenue
it is reporting for federal and state tax purposes? Or that it is making
cash deposits or withdrawals over a “short period of time” that are
77. See, e.g., Deirdre Fernandes, Banks Shun Fledgling Marijuana Firms in Mass,
THE BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 29, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
business/2014/01/29/medical-marijuana-firms-face-cash-economy-banks-
steer-clear/88tfUTUbcaYvZfA7fpuENN/story.html; Eric Gorski, Reluctance
of Banks Leaves Pot Shops Looing for Secure Practices, THE DENVER POST
(June 15, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/2014/06/14/reluctance-of-
banks-leaves-pot-shops-looking-for-secure-practices/.
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“excessive relative to local competitors” or the “expected activity of the
business”?  Or that its customer is “seeking to conceal or disguise in-
volvement in marijuana-related business activity” by using a “non-
descript name” (e.g., a “consulting,” “holding,” or “management”
company) that “purports to engage in commercial activity unrelated
to marijuana, but is depositing cash that smells like marijuana”! Or
that the marijuana-related business’s “proximity to a school” is not
“compliant with state law” (ignoring for the moment that all MMM
Law locations are approved by the Commission as a matter of course,
in the first place)? Given all this, one is impelled to conclude that the
only prudent course for banking industry participants is to ensure that
they have no exposure to, and no dealings with, any parties even re-
motely related to state-sanctioned marijuana related businesses.
In fact, the federal courts have upheld elements of the U.S. banking
system in their determination to prevent access to the system by mari-
juana-related enterprises. For example, on January 5, 2016, in the case
of Fourth Corner Credit Union v. FRB of Kansas City,78 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado refused to direct the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas to grant a “master account” to a Colorado credit
union founded to provide financial services to marijuana-related busi-
nesses, on the grounds that marijuana remains an illegal substance
under the CSA. As the Court explained, even if prosecutors and bank
regulators are willing to “look the other way” by condoning the sale of
marijuana under state law, “[a] federal court cannot look the other
way.”79
The Court’s response and observations in Fourth Corner Credit Union
highlight the many other obstacles and elements of resistance that
marijuana-related business participants can expect to face when their
business ventures intersect with the federal, legal, and regulatory
spheres. Tax and bankruptcy law provide just two additional exam-
ples. For instance, it has long been a well-established principle for fed-
eral income tax purposes that unlawful, as well as lawful, gains are
comprehended within the term “gross income.”80 Though a medical
marijuana business is illegal under federal law, it remains obligated to
pay federal income tax on its taxable income because the Internal
Revenue Code does not differentiate between income derived from
legal sources and income derived from illegal sources.81 But Section
280E of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no deduction or
credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or busi-
ness (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists
78. See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. FRB of Kan. City, 154 F. Supp. 3d 1185
(D. Colo. 2016).
79. Id. at 4.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1984).
81. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961).
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of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of Sched-
ules I and II of the CSA), which is prohibited by federal law or the law
of any state in which such trade or business is conducted.82 As a result
of this provision, marijuana merchants, unlike most businesses,83 may
not deduct operating expenses (e.g., general labor, rent, and utilities)
in order to compute net taxable income for the purpose of calculating
federal income tax liability.84 For owners of real property leased to
operating marijuana-related enterprises, there is some question
whether normal and customary costs and expenses in operating the
property (e.g., taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance and other oper-
ating costs and the like, interest on mortgage indebtedness, leasing
transactions or enforcement costs) would be deductible.
In the bankruptcy arena, federal bankruptcy courts have been uni-
formly reluctant to extend the protections of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code85 to debtors engaged in medical marijuana businesses that are
legal under state law.  For example, in In re Arenas,86 on appeal from a
decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Col-
orado dismissing a petitioner’s Chapter 7 filing, the Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit court upheld the dismissal of the
would-be debtor’s Chapter 7 case, holding that a debtor in the mari-
juana business cannot obtain relief in the federal bankruptcy court.
The appellate panel agreed with the Chapter 7 trustee, the United
States trustee, and the lower court that the marijuana-related assets
could not be administered under federal law, since selling and distrib-
uting proceeds from marijuana-related assets would be federal of-
fenses under the CSA. The debtors jointly owned commercial
property in Denver, Colorado, occupying one portion for the produc-
tion of marijuana, and leasing out the remainder to others, who oper-
ated a marijuana dispensary in it. The activities, while lawful under
Colorado law, violated the CSA. The United States Trustee filed a mo-
tion to dismiss for cause under § 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, as-
serting that it would be impossible for a Chapter 7 trustee to
administer the assets of the debtors’ estate without violating federal
law. In response, the debtors moved to convert their case to Chapter
13 and objected to the motion to dismiss. After an evidentiary hearing
on both motions, the bankruptcy court issued a written order denying
the debtors’ motion to convert and granting the U.S. Trustee’s mo-
tion to dismiss. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reasoned that in light
82. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2016).
83. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2014).
84. See, e.g., Olive v. Comm’r, 792 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2015) (ruling that a San
Francisco marijuana dispensary was precluded from taking a business ex-
pense deduction under the Internal Revenue Code because its “trade or
business . . . consists of trafficking in controlled substances . . . prohibited
by federal law.”).
85. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-112.
86. In re Arenas v. U.S. Tr., 535 B.R. 845 (BAP 10th Cir. 2015).
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of the fact that the debtors’ conduct constituted an on-going criminal
enterprise under federal law, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel cited
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.87 for the proposition that debtor who
is involved in unlawful or deceitful conduct may not seek the protec-
tions afforded by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code because the conduct be-
trays a lack of good faith that would bar confirmation.
Further, courts have determined that an involuntary Chapter 7 peti-
tion cannot be filed against a medical marijuana business. In In re
Medpoint Management, LLC,88 a nonprofit was authorized to operate a
medical marijuana dispensary under Arizona law, and engaged
Medpoint Management, LLC (“Medpoint”) as a dispensary-manage-
ment company to receive and hold revenue derived from marijuana,
as provided by Arizona law. Creditors of Medpoint filed a Chapter 7
involuntary petition against it. Medpoint opposed the involuntary pe-
tition and argued that the trustee would not be able to administer
marijuana-related assets against federal law. The court concluded that
there was sufficient cause to dismiss the involuntary petition against
Medpoint, because under the CSA a trustee had to place the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting public health first, and that the risk of a
forfeiture or seizure of the marijuana-related assets or a charge for
facilitating a CSA offense was not acceptable for a trustee and the
estate.
In a case of particular interest to commercial landlords who lease
industrial or retail space to state-licensed marijuana growers, proces-
sors or dispensers, a bankruptcy court for the District of Colorado has
ruled that such activity itself amounts to an on-going criminal enter-
prise under the CSA, and thus tainted the would-be landlord debtor
with “unclean hands,” barring it from seeking relief and the right to
reorganize under Chapter 11. In In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd.,89
the debtor leased warehouse space to tenants who legally grew mari-
juana under Colorado law, and derived about 25% of its income from
those leases. The debtor’s property was subject to mortgage liens, and
secured creditor, on learning of such activities, called the loan, and
sought to foreclose its mortgage lien. The debtor sought protection
under Chapter 11 and the secured creditor moved to dismiss the case,
arguing that the debtor’s activities amounted to an on-going violation
of the so-called “crack-house” statute provisions of the CSA,90 thereby
subjecting the debtor’s property to federal criminal and civil forfei-
ture, which would completely divest the secured lender’s lien. The
court held that, whether characterized, strictly speaking, as an applica-
tion of  the “unclean hands” doctrine or simply as a part of the court’s
totality of the circumstances “cause” analysis, the Chapter 11 debtor’s
87. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374-75 (2007).
88. In re Medpoint Management, L.L.C., 528 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2015).
89. In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd., 484 B.R. 799 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).
90. 21 U.S.C. §§ 856 (2003); 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (2002).
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continued criminal activity, in deriving roughly 25% of its revenues
from leasing warehouse space to tenants who, to debtor’s knowledge,
were engaged in the business of growing marijuana without a certifi-
cate of approval from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), satisfied
requirement of “cause” and required dismissal or conversion of its
Chapter 11 case, whichever was in the best interests of creditors and
estate. The court further held that the Chapter 11 debtor, in leasing
out a portion of its warehouse to parties to cultivate marijuana there
and thereby subjecting the secured creditor’s collateral to potential
forfeiture under the CSA, “grossly mismanaged the estate,” and pro-
vided “cause” for dismissal or conversion of case, notwithstanding
debtor’s belief that the possibility of federal narcotics prosecution,
and of loss of its warehouse to forfeiture, was remote in light of Colo-
rado’s legalization of recreational production and sale of marijuana.
The court reasoned that it could not use the adjudicative authority
granted to it by Congress to force a creditor to bear even a highly
improbable risk of the total loss of its collateral. The court stated that
“[u]nless and until Congress changes [federal drug] law, the Debtor’s
operations constitute a continuing criminal violation of the CSA and a
federal court cannot be asked to enforce the protections of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in aid of a Debtor whose activities constitute a continuing
federal crime.”91
The Rent-Rite court specifically considered and dismissed the
debtor’s claims that DOJ’s expressions of prosecutorial discretion, as
reflected in the DOJ Memoranda referred to above, ought to bear any
weight in its determinations. According to the court:
In light of Colorado’s laws and constitutional amendment le-
galizing marijuana, federal prosecutors may well choose to
exercise their prosecutorial discretion and decline to seek in-
dictments under the CSA where the activity that is illegal on
the federal level is legal under Colorado state law. Be that as
it may, even if the Debtor is never charged or prosecuted
under the CSA, it is conducting operations in the normal
course of its business that violate federal criminal law. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Stacy, 734 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1078–81 (S.D. Cal.
2010) (criminal defendant cannot rely on public statements
of non-prosecution policy issued by administration officials
or justice department). Unless and until Congress changes
that law, the Debtor’s operations constitute a continuing
criminal violation of the CSA and a federal court cannot be
asked to enforce the protections of the Bankruptcy Code in
aid of a Debtor whose activities constitute a continuing fed-
eral crime.92
91. Rent-Rite, 484 B.R. at 805.
92. Id.
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On the other hand, the unclean hands doctrine might not bar a
creditor’s request for relief in all situations. In Northbay Wellness Group,
Inc. v. Beyries,93 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed a lower court’s decision preventing a creditor—a company that
was engaged in marijuana-related activity—from seeking the non-dis-
chargeability of a claim against an individual Chapter 7 debtor who
was not engaged in marijuana-related activity. The debtor was a for-
mer member of the company’s board of directors, and had served and
was paid as the company’s attorney. He was accused of stealing
$25,000 from a legal defense trust fund that the company entrusted
with the debtor. The lower court denied the company a judgment of
non-dischargeability because the nature of its business was illegal
under federal law. But the court of appeals concluded that the
debtor’s wrongful conduct outweighed the illegality of the company’s
business and that “[a]llowing [the debtor] to avoid through bank-
ruptcy his responsibility for misappropriating his client’s money would
undermine the public interest in holding attorneys to high ethical
standards.”94
Some Implications for MMM Law Participants and their Counsel
The remainder of this article will focus on some of the most obvious
implications which are likely to arise in Maryland as the result of the
divergent Federal and Maryland state approaches to medical mari-
juana, as reflected in the CSA and the MMM Law, and in particular (i)
from a real estate transactional perspective, (ii) in the zoning and
land use arena, with regard to the problems which will arise due to the
ambiguities contained in the MMM Law itself and its failure to ac-
count for the necessary interplay between its terms and various local
land use regulations and finally, (iii) with respect to the ethical
problems that lawyers can be expected to face in advising would-be
MMM Law participants.
Marijuana-related Activities and the Landlord/Tenant Relationship
As noted earlier, under the MMM Law the number of licenses al-
lowed to be issued by the Commission during this initial round of
application, though limited, is still sizable: up to fifteen grower li-
censes,95 up to two dispensary licenses per State senatorial district
(i.e., 94 licenses in total)96 and an unlimited number of processing
licenses may be issued. The Commission was unexpectedly inundated
93. Northbay Wellness Group, Inc. v. Beyries, 789 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 961.
95. MD CODE REGS. 10.62.01.01.A.1. This limitation on grow licenses shall only
be in effect until May 31, 2016, in accordance with Health General Article,
Section 13-3309(a)(2), MD Ann. Code.
96. MD CODE REGS. 10.62.15.07.A.1.
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with applications for these three types of licenses.97 Given the nature
of all of the contemplated facilities it is reasonable to suppose that the
vast majority of these operations will be conducted on leased sites, as
opposed to within owner-occupied premises, and therefore it may be
most instructive to consider the prospective transactional impact of
the MMM Law in light of a hypothetical landlord-tenant relationship.
The late Nancy Reagan was no lawyer, but she may have had the last
word in advice for would-be Maryland landlords when approached by
MMM Law licensees looking to lease commercial, industrial or retail
space for use in the operation of growing and production facilities,
distribution centers or retail dispensaries: “JUST SAY NO.”
Given the existence of the MMM Laws, the clear statement of DOJ
with respect to federal prosecutorial discretion, as reflected in the
DOJ Memoranda and FinCEN Guidance, the congressional budgetary
directives embodied in The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016,
the implications of the CARERS Act, and the growing trend toward
legalization in the states, commercial landlords and property owners
in Maryland might be tempted to think that it would be a good and
profitable idea for them to lease commercial, industrial or retail space
to MMM Law licensees, for use in the operation of growing and pro-
duction facilities, distribution centers and retail dispensaries. But they
would be wrong.
There is simply no question that, in engaging in such leasing trans-
actions, landlords violate the CSA and, in so doing, effectively engage
in an on-going criminal enterprise, in violation of federal law; and,
indirectly, they violate separate federal laws in aiding and abetting the
MMM Law licensees in activities which also directly violate the CSA.
Some Landlords will be tempted to rationalize this activity, conclud-
ing that current federal enforcement priorities make prosecution un-
likely, even though there can be no guarantees in that regard. But a
landlord’s analysis cannot be permitted to end there because, quite
apart from any theoretical and remote risk of criminal prosecution,
there are any number of very practical, very predictable and very prob-
able consequences which are likely to result from such a decision, and
which will inevitably cripple, if not destroy, that landlord’s real estate
enterprise. One need only consider the hypothetical lease transaction
from the limited standpoints of (i) the FinCEN Guidance and the
banking community’s response to it, (ii) the reactions of the federal
bankruptcy court and federal judiciary generally, and (iii) the Internal
Revenue Code and Regulations to see why this is so.
97. The Commission received 1,081 applications consisting of 146 applications
for a grower license, 124 applications for processor license, and 811 appli-
cations for dispensary license. See Press Release, Maryland Medical Canna-
bis Commission, Natalie M. LaPrade Maryland Medical Cannabis
Commission Announces Revised Scoring Timeline for Grower and Proces-
sor License Applications (Dec. 21, 2015).
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As indicated earlier, a landlord is not prohibited under Maryland
law from providing leasehold space to the MMM Law licensee, but it
will clearly be criminally liable under the CSA for knowingly aiding
the MMM Law licensee in violating the CSA, in an on-going criminal
offence. Additionally, the landlord as well as its owners and employ-
ees, separately and personally, will be liable to federal criminal prose-
cution for conspiracy and for aiding and abetting the MMM Law
licensee in violating the CSA, in an on-going criminal offence. All of
the landlord’s real property which is leased to its tenant for such activ-
ities is subject to criminal as well as civil forfeiture under the CSA. If
the leased premises consist of an un-subdivided part of landlord’s
larger holdings (as, for example, one warehouse or unit in a larger
industrial complex) it is almost certain that the entirety of the un-
subdivided holding would be liable to forfeiture proceedings. Penal-
ties for violating the federal drug laws may also include imprisonment,
fines, criminal forfeitures, civil forfeitures and civil penalties.
Though current federal enforcement priorities make prosecution
unlikely, there can be no guarantee that the enforcement priorities
embodied in the DOJ Memoranda will remain in effect, or that DOJ
will determine that the MMM Laws, generally applied or pertaining to
a particular location or operation, do not constitute, or no longer
constitute “strong and effective” regulatory and enforcement controls
on marijuana cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession, so that
such operations pose unacceptable practical risks  to “public safety,
public health, and other law enforcement interests,” sufficient to war-
rant federal intervention.
Funds that a marijuana business has paid to a landlord as rent are
subject to forfeiture if either the business or the landlord is prose-
cuted for violation of federal drug laws. Moreover, as indicated above,
in a civil forfeiture proceeding the criminal prosecution of the land-
lord or the MMM Law licensee is not even necessary. And in any
event, to the extent that the landlord receives greater than $10,000 in
cash in connection with the services (whether such cash is received in
one lump sum, or over time), the landlord will be required to file
certain information about each transaction with the IRS, in accor-
dance with the FinCEN Guidance. The landlord will have to ensure
that its licensee tenant acknowledges and agrees to these reporting
requirements in its lease. Better yet, the landlord will need to ensure
that its tenant understands and agrees that cash payments of rent
WILL NOT be accepted, which in turn means that the landlord will
need to ensure that its tenant, or some guarantor on behalf of its ten-
ant, is able to access the banking system in order to make regular pay-
ments of rent by check or wire transfer. As indicated above, in practice
this has proved practically impossible for many licensees in other
states.
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This last point highlights a further concern for landlords, which is
that by leasing space to MMM Law licensees, and thereby aiding and
abetting these licensees in violating the CSA, these landlords must in-
evitably subject themselves to the same scrutiny and ostracism by the
financial community as experienced by those licensees. The FinCEN
Guidance makes no distinction between the licensees and their land-
lords in this respect. As indicated above, experience in other states has
shown that the banking community’s response to the FinCEN Gui-
dance has been to wall off all aspects of state-sponsored marijuana
activities, even to the point of denying federal reserve licensure to a
state-chartered credit union which was created for the purpose of pro-
viding banking services to licensees.98
Under these circumstances a landlord desiring to lease space to a
MMM Law licensee must consider the very real and practical risk of
one or more of the following consequences. If landlord’s property is
subject to existing secured lending, then by entering into such a lease
it is likely that the landlord will violate fairly standard mortgage loan
covenants which require the landlord to operate the mortgaged prop-
erty in compliance with “all laws.” If and when this is discovered a
mortgagee’s response may well be to call a default and seek to fore-
close its mortgage lien.99 Obviously, if the loan has been personally
guaranteed this presents very significant problems for the guarantor.
Even if the loan is guaranteed on a qualified non-recourse basis, care
ought to be given in order to analyze the scope of the “bad-boy carve-
outs” in order to determine whether one or more of these might ap-
ply. As indicated in In re Rent-Rite,100 bankruptcy protection may not
be available to protect the landlord—or any personal guarantors of
landlord’s loan—from lien enforcement claims by an aggrieve mort-
gagee. Furthermore, the landlord’s lender’s established policies in ap-
plying the FinCEN Guidance with respect to its marijuana-related
customers may well prompt the lender to close, or to restrict, land-
lord’s depositary accounts, or at a minimum to subject landlord’s to
onerous reporting and monitoring requirements, in order for the
lender to feel justified in permitting the accounts to remain open.
Even if a landlord manages to fly below its lender’s radar from the
standpoint of operational oversight, it is almost inevitable that, in con-
nection with any refinancing of landlord’s mortgage loan, landlord’s
connection to the marijuana industry will be discovered, and in that
case it is likely that landlord will be unable to obtain refinancing
within the commercial banking community. If it can find mortgage
refinancing anywhere it may be forced to resort to “hard money” lend-
ing sources, on comparatively extortionate terms.
98. See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. FRB of Kan. City, No. 15-cv-01633-RBJ, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 517 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2016).
99. Rent-Rite, supra note 81.
100. Id.
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The same considerations will apply should a landlord seek to sell its
property: any prospective buyer will face the same barriers to access to
purchase money mortgage financing as the selling landlord faced in
the first instance. Moreover, any buyer for cash will inevitably seek to
discount the purchase price in order to reflect the property’s practical
restriction to access to financing.
From the standpoint of income taxation, the landlord will be re-
quired to pay federal income tax on the proceeds of its leasing activi-
ties to medical marijuana businesses, but under certain circumstances
it may not be able to deduct the expenses incurred in connection with
such leasing activities. And, as indicated above, the landlord may not
be able to seek relief from the bankruptcy courts if a medical mari-
juana business customer is unable to satisfy its obligations to the land-
lord, and the landlord’s project fails.
Finally, the landlord’s lease enforcement activities, for monetary
and non-monetary defaults, will inevitably be made more problematic
by the fact that the space is occupied and operated for marijuana-
related activities. For example, how is an eviction to be conducted?
How will controlled substances be removed? By whom? To where? To
what extent will the landlord be forced/required/permitted to take
custody or control of controlled substances, in vacating the premises
and regaining possession? What increased costs will landlord incur in
restoring the premises for re-occupancy (removal of all traces of con-
traband substances for example, or disposal of marijuana-related by-
products or waste, which have been left over).
This parade of horribles is neither far-fetched nor by any means
exhaustive. Taken together, they demonstrate fairly conclusively that,
given the divergence in approach to medical marijuana-related activi-
ties, as embodied in the CSA and the MMM Laws, leasing space to a
would-be MMM Law participant is surely a hard and risky way for a
landlord to make a buck.
Zoning and Land Use Perspectives
When one considers the applications and approvals processes
under the MMM Laws in light of local governmental zoning and land
use regulations it is fairly easy to conclude that few if any land develop-
ment practitioners were present at the legislative drafting sessions.
The disconnects, the ambiguities and the omissions between the
MMM Laws and most local zoning and land use permitting processes
are simply too large to be ignored, and they point to real practical
difficulties which are likely to arise as state officials and would-be mar-
ket participants seek to take advantage of the law.101
101. There are 15 commissioners serving on the Commission.  The qualifica-
tions of these Commissioners include experience in the medical and phar-
macy industries, academia, government administration, police, two lawyers,
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Under the MMM Laws, the Commission will grant approvals in two
phases: “pre-approvals” of license applications will occur in Stage-One,
with final approval (involving the issuance of a license to grow, pro-
cess or dispense, either separately or in combination) being granted
in Stage-Two. The Commission anticipates that all approvals required
for Stage-Two final approval will be obtained by applicants within one
year following the Commission’s Stage-One pre-approval. Evidence of
zoning approval is not required to be provided by an applicant to the
Commission until after Stage-One pre-approval from the Commission
is granted. Therefore, any applicant successfully pre-approved in
Stage-One must obtain all required local development approvals
within the one-year gap between Stage-One and Stage-Two approval
(unless such approvals had been obtained before-hand, which seems
unlikely, given the nature of the proposed uses and the current state
of most local jurisdictions’ zoning and land use ordinances, discussed
below).
Applicants who receive Stage-One approval will have a lot to do dur-
ing this one year period. At present very few municipalities have en-
acted zoning code provisions to specifically regulate the growth,
processing, and dispensing of “Medical Cannabis,” including “Medical
Cannabis Concentrate,” “Medical Cannabis Finished Product” or
“Medical Cannabis Infused Products.”102 The vast majority of Mary-
land counties and municipalities with independent zoning and land
use authority have no regulatory provisions which specifically address
these proposed uses.
It is standard practice for any person seeking information on the
zoning designation of a particular property to refer to the applicable
zoning code and zoning map in order to determine whether, within a
given zoning district, a proposed use is either (i) permitted by right,
(ii) permitted by special exception or conditional use, or (iii) not per-
mitted at all. Given that, for the majority of Maryland counties or mu-
nicipalities, the applicable zoning code or land use regulation is silent
when it comes to medical cannabis-related uses, it is reasonable to ask
some fairly simple questions: Will these municipalities inadvertently or
intentionally “zone out” medical cannabis-related uses by restricting
where any of these uses may lawfully locate? Will Stage-One pre-ap-
proved applicants need to wait until the municipality amends its ordi-
nance in order to approve the proposed location for use? If so, for
how long? And how will that delay affect the viability of the Stage-One
and a mother of twins with life limiting forms of epilepsy. Based on the
individual biographies for each Commissioner posted on the Commission’s
website, no Commissioner has a background in real estate, zoning, and
land use principles. Commissioners, MEDICAL MARYLAND CANNABIS COMMIS-
SION, (last updated 5/19/2016), http://mmcc.maryland.gov/pages/
home/commissioners.aspx.
102. MD CODE REGS. 10.62.01-10.62-35.
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approval? Will the public hearing requirements that usually pertain to
requests for special exceptions and conditional uses under most land
use ordinances, together with third-party protestants’ appeal rights, be
expected to further delay required final zoning approvals well beyond
the one-year period between Stage-One and Stage-Two approvals?
And, if so, once again, how will that delay be expected to affect the
conditional, Stage-One approval?
As indicated earlier, on December 21, 2015, the Commission an-
nounced that it had received 146 grower license applications (for the
fifteen available grower licenses), 124 processor license applications
and 811 dispensary license applications (for the 94 available dispen-
sary license locations—two per state senatorial district) and that, in
response to the overwhelming number of applications received, the
Commission revised its schedule and stated that it anticipated issuing
Stage-One awards for grower and processor applicants by summer
2016. The revised schedule for the issuance of Stage-One approval of
dispensary applicants was stated to be announced “in the near future.”
Observers of the Stage-One pre-approval process will be interested to
learn where the proposed pre-approved licensed facilities will be lo-
cated, and whether, or to what extent, their geographical distributions
correspond to the purposes and intent of the MMM Laws. It may be,
for example, that multiple licensed grower facilities are proposed to
be situated in one given county or municipality, while other jurisdic-
tions are left with none.
Furthermore, not all real estate is created equal. Desirable site at-
tributes or requirements will certainly vary depending upon the na-
ture of the licensed activity which is proposed to be located, and not
all jurisdictions may be suitable to accommodate all medical cannabis-
related uses. For example, applicants looking to site a growing and
processing facility may well place a premium on appropriately zoned
properties affording maximum privacy and seclusion, in order to en-
hance site security, accommodate required or desired security fea-
tures, mandated setbacks from neighboring uses, and the availability
of adequate or redundant sources of water and power.  Additional ac-
commodations would need to be made for “volatile processing,” of
medical cannabis, using butane or other similar materials, since fed-
eral regulations impose separate setback requirements (at least 200
feet) for the use of these products in the manufacturing process.103
Obviously, any such property should not be subject to development
permit moratoria or other restrictions affecting the supply of public
water, storm water management and sewer service, electric service, gas
service, and telephone service. If outdoor growing facilities are to be
installed then site security and set-back issues, as well as favorable soil
quality and groundwater conditions become more important. All of
103. 49 C.F.R. §173.5 (2016).
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these attributes or considerations will apply regardless whether the fa-
cility is to be leased or owner-operated.
On the other hand, proposed dispensary applicants will be ex-
pected to seek sites affording proximity to a large customer base, as
well as affording adequate parking and visible signage, along with the
ability to comply with any setback and security requirements. As with
growing and processing facilities, all of these features would be impor-
tant regardless whether the subject property is to leased by the appli-
cant or owner-occupied. And, if a purchase is contemplated, then
obviously, from an applicant-purchaser’s perspective, any contract of
sale should ideally condition the applicant-purchaser’s obligation to
close upon its receipt of the relevant Stage-Two license approval, in
which case the purchase agreement should include a clause requiring
the seller to cooperate with the applicant-purchaser’s efforts to obtain
required zoning and land use approvals.
A review of the COMAR provisions implementing the MMM Laws
suggests that the impact of local planning and zoning ordinances was
not deeply considered in the development of the State regulatory
scheme. Although applicants are required to submit a detailed appli-
cation to the Commission104 most of the required submittals relate to
the applicant itself, its constituent owners and operators and its capi-
talization and prior experience in the medical cannabis industry (and
additionally, for grower license applications, knowledge of commer-
cial horticulture or agronomic production).105 Information respect-
ing the proposed facility itself appears to have been included in the
application as an afterthought. For example, according to the Com-
mission applicants can choose any location in Maryland for their pro-
posed facilities as long as local zoning laws permit the activity and
location.  As part of its Stage-One application for a grower, processor
or dispensary license, the applicant must include a “preliminary site
plan,” a “security plan,” a “plan for quality control,” a “plan for inven-
torying, safekeeping and tracking,” and a “disposal plan.” But the de-
tails pertaining to the actual real estate that would host the licensed
facility are limited to “a description of the proposed premises, includ-
ing a preliminary site plan.”106
COMAR provides that the Commission’s review of all submitted ap-
plications will be ranked using an “impartial and numerically scored
competitive bidding process.”107 As respects the ranking of dispensary
applications, zoning and land use considerations are not mentioned
at all; rather, the racial, ethnic, and geographic diversity of the pro-
posed applicants is listed as the first criterion.108 In the case of grower
104. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.06.02 and MD CODE REGS. 10.62.15.02.
105. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.06.02(B) and MD CODE REGS. 10.62.15.02.
106. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.06.02(C.7).
107. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.06.05(H).
108. MD HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 13-3306 (2016).
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license applications, the location of the proposed licensed grower fa-
cility in “an agricultural zone” is listed as the first criterion for the
Commission to consider, but no further information about the mean-
ing of “agricultural zone” is offered in COMAR. It is interesting to
note that some Maryland counties or other jurisdictions having zon-
ing authority, such as Baltimore City, have no “agricultural zones”
whatsoever. Other jurisdictions, such as Carroll County, allow agricul-
tural uses in all zoning districts. It is by no means certain that any
Maryland jurisdiction would treat—or could be compelled by the
Commission or other element of State government to treat—the
growing of medical cannabis as an agricultural use. But assuming that
it were so considered by such a jurisdiction then grower facilities
would theoretically be permitted throughout the entirety of that juris-
diction. Therefore, by operation of the applicable zoning and land
use ordinances throughout the State we may well see that licensed
grower facilities are wholly barred in some jurisdictions while in
others grower facilities might be established throughout the jurisdic-
tion, as agricultural uses, as being permitted “as of right.”
COMAR also provides that a licensed dispensary may co-locate with
a grower facility if either: (i) an entrance for the dispensary is availa-
ble separate from the primary entrance of the portion of the facility
used for growing, or (ii) the dispensary is located “at premises that are
located in close proximity to the premises at which the licensee grows
medical marijuana.”109 From a zoning and land use perspective this
provision is problematic on at least two grounds. First, if a grower fa-
cility and a dispensary are co-located in the same premises then the
relevant jurisdiction will need to consider how to treat the proposed
mixed use for zoning purposes. For example, under a given ordinance
the dispensary use might disqualify the facility for approval as an agri-
cultural use. Second, given that COMAR requires that the co-located
dispensary be located within “close proximity” to the grower facility, it
is unclear that the provision requires the co-located uses to occupy the
same legal lot of record, or whether neighboring parcels will qualify.
But this may in turn affect the zoning and land use application pro-
cess, as these typically apply to a single parcel.
COMAR’s definition of “licensed dispensary” also poses potential
zoning and land use applications problems. The definition does not
contain a reference to the medical nature of the cannabis it would be
dispensing.  COMAR defines “licensed dispensary” as “[. . .] a dispen-
sary licensed by the Commission that acquires, possesses, repackages,
processes, transfers, transports, sells, distributes, or dispenses, prod-
ucts containing marijuana, related supplies, related products includ-
ing tinctures, aerosols, oils, or ointments, or educational materials for
109. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.13.02.
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use by a qualifying patient or caregiver.”110 But this definition does
not include any reference to the defined term, “finished medical ma-
rijuana product.”111 Therefore, a jurisdiction might elect not to treat a
“licensed dispensary” as the equivalent as a pharmacy for zoning classi-
fication purposes since the medical component—“finished medical
marijuana product”—is missing from the defined term.  Conversely,
the definition for “licensed grower” specifically references the cultiva-
tion, manufacturing, processing, packaging, and dispensing of “medi-
cal marijuana”112 to provide such product to a qualifying patient,
caregiver, or licensed dispensary.113
COMAR provides that the Commission will notify each of the fif-
teen pre-approved grower license applicants of their selection within
ten business days following the Commission’s determination,114 at
which point these Stage-One grower license applicants must com-
mence to secure all relevant zoning approvals sufficient to permit the
operation of grower facilities at their respective designated locations.
Receipt of all required zoning and land use approvals is a precondi-
tion to the issuance of Stage-Two final approval for these facilities by
the Commission.  COMAR provides that a final grower license may be
issued to either grow, or to both grow and distribute “medical mari-
juana” upon the Commission’s determination that the proposed loca-
tion of the facility, among other requirements, complies “with all
zoning and planning requirements.”115 In describing any licensed
grower facility, COMAR simply requires that the applicant and its use
of the proposed facility shall, among other requirements, “conform to
local zoning and planning requirements.”116 But COMAR does not
address how a mixed use—a combination grower/dispensary facil-
ity—would be treated for zoning purposes if dispensaries are not per-
mitted in an agricultural zoning districts. Furthermore, if under
COMAR the location of a grower facility on an agriculturally zoned
parcel satisfies a preferred criterion, then would the co-location of a
grower facility and a dispensary violate this criterion if the grower fa-
cility would, by being co-located, no longer be eligible, under the local
zoning ordinance, to be located in an agricultural district?
Other local planning and land use and development requirements
potentially will be implicated by the need to comply with the COMAR
provisions for site location and construction. For example, if an appli-
cant for a grower license wishes to cultivate medical cannabis out-
doors or in a greenhouse at ground level at a licensed premises, then
110. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.01.01.13.
111. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.01.01.20.
112. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.01.01.14.
113. MD CODE REGS., 10.62.01.01.13-14.
114. MD CODE REGS. 10.62.08.07.(D).
115. MD CODE REGS. 10.62.19.06.(B).2.(b).
116. MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.08.02(B)(3) (2015).
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COMAR requires that, as part of its security plan, the proposed licen-
see must install chain-linked fencing surrounding either the open
field or the greenhouse that is at least 8 feet in height and topped with
multiple strands of barbed wire.117 However, many jurisdictions re-
strict the type or size or material of fencing in a given zone, or impose
set-backs for their location. COMAR provides no guidance for a case
in which compliance with its detailed regulations is forbidden under
the applicable zoning, land use or development regulations.
Finally, COMAR provides that the Commission reserves the right to
“rescind pre-approval of a grower license if the grower is not opera-
tional within 1 year of pre-approval”118  but the regulation does not
define what “operational” means. To the extent that it is interpreted
to mean that the facility is in operation in the normal course, for its
stated purpose, i.e., for the planting of seed for the production of
medical cannabis, then it should be obvious that that would not be
possible unless the final, Stage-Two, license approval had been issued
for the operation of the grower facility, in the first place, in which case
the provision is a nonsense. Or does the provision merely mean to
suggest that the applicant be “operational” in the sense that it is an
entity in good standing in Maryland and ready to commence opera-
tions?  We will not know the answer to this question until and unless
an applicant fails to meet this requirement and the Commission actu-
ally exercises its discretionary right to rescind.
As of April 2016, the zoning and land use regulatory response of the
various Maryland jurisdictions has been spotty. Only Anne Arundel,
Baltimore County and Prince Georges Counties have enacted amend-
ments to their zoning ordinances that specifically regulate the loca-
tion of licensed grower facilities. The Anne Arundel County Council
amended its County Code to permit dispensaries as a special excep-
tion in certain commercial and industrial zoning districts and as a
conditional use in certain industrial zoning districts.119   The County
Code was further amended to permit both growing and processing
facilities as a conditional use in the RA district and in certain commer-
cial and industrial zoning districts.120 The definition of “farming” in
the County Code was also amended to specifically exclude any use
relating to the growing, processing, or dispensing medical
cannabis.121
The Baltimore County Council amended the County’s zoning regu-
lations in 2015 in anticipation of the new uses.122 Pursuant to the
117. MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.08.03(B)(2), 10.62.08.04(D)(1) (2015).
118. MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.08.06(E) (2015).
119. Anne Arundel County, MD, County Council Bill 95-15 (2015).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., COUNTY COUNCIL BILL 61-15 (2015); BALTIMORE
COUNTY, MD., COUNTY COUNCIL BILL 83-15 (2015).
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newly adopted amendments, dispensaries will be permitted by right in
the County’s business districts, BR, BM, BL, BLR, and O-R unless the
property is located in one of these zoning districts as well as in the
County’s Commercial Revitalization District.  If the property falls
within the Commercial Revitalization District, any application for zon-
ing approval for a dispensary would require the County to grant a
special exception for that use.  Special exceptions in the County re-
quire community input meetings and public hearings before the
County’s hearing officer and zoning commissioner.  These hearings
require additional time for the County’s review and approval than if
the use was permitted by right – to say nothing of protestants’ rights to
appeal any grant of approval over protestants’ objections. The Balti-
more County zoning amendments also impose additional setback re-
quirements: no dispensary in the County may be located within 500
feet of a public or private elementary, middle, or high school, or
within 2,500 feet from another medical cannabis dispensary.123 The
County zoning amendments also allow growing and processing facili-
ties to be located as of right in RC2, SE, and ML-IM zoning districts
unless the property is located in the ML-IM zoning district and in the
Chesapeake Enterprise Zone.  In any such case, a special exception
approval would be required for any growing or processing facility in
that combination of the enterprise zone and the ML-IM zoning dis-
trict.  Special exception approvals would also be required for any
growing or processing facility in the County’s RC7 and RC8 zoning
districts.124
Amendments made to the Prince George’s County zoning code in
2016 are more stringent than those adopted by Baltimore County.
Special exceptions are required for any growing, processing, or dis-
pensing licensed facility in the County and dispensaries and growers
 must be within, or adjacent to, a County medical facility, including a
doctor’s office, medical clinic, or hospital.  Processing would be
treated as an accessory use to a growing facility. 125  Once again, spe-
cial exceptions in the County would require public hearings, and,
once again, one need also consider potential protestants’ rights to ap-
peal any grant of approval over protestants’ objections.
Carroll County has made no formal amendments to its zoning and
land use ordinances and development regulations but the County
Zoning Administrator has stated that the County plans to treat medi-
cal cannabis growing as an agricultural use, processing as an industrial
use, and dispensing as a pharmacy use.126 He also stated that if the
growing and processing uses are combined at one facility then the
123. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., COUNTY COUNCIL BILL 61-15 (2015).
124. Id.
125. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MD., COUNTY COUNCIL CB-5-2016.
126. Telephone Interview with Jay Voight, Zoning Administrator for Carroll
County, Maryland (Mar. 7, 2016).
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combined use will be treated as a commercial nursery for zoning ap-
proval purposes.127 Furthermore, if new construction is involved for
any of these uses then applicant would be required to comply with the
County’s site plan review requirements. Even if no new construction is
required a “change of tenant” permit would still be required.  And if
open-field cultivation is planned, then the County has stated that it
will require the applicant to obtain a “zoning certificate.”
In Baltimore City the City Council has considered imposing new
regulations on these uses but no zoning code amendments have been
adopted. City officials have indicated that they plan to treat growing
and processing as industrial uses that would be allowed in the indus-
trial zoning districts, while dispensaries would be treated in the same
manner as a retail drug store or pharmacy, and permitted in the City’s
business districts.
Other Maryland jurisdictions have considered the subject but have
not amended their zoning codes, nor have they evidenced an intent to
do so by adapting their existing zoning classifications to include refer-
ence to the relevant definitions in COMAR for growing, processing,
and dispensing medical cannabis. This means that many potential
Stage-One grower applicants will need to apply for all necessary zon-
ing approvals, as well as required inspections and permits in jurisdic-
tions whose zoning and land use and development ordinances make
no specific provision for their proposed uses.
So throughout most of Maryland the processes by which a Stage-
One pre-approved applicant will obtain final zoning and land use ap-
provals remain unclear, and is likely to remain so until after Stage-
One approvals are granted by the Commission and applicants seek to
obtain all required zoning approvals within the time prescribed for
Stage-Two approvals. COMAR is presently vague about the sort of zon-
ing or land use approvals that will be required as a precondition to the
issuance of Stage-Two or final issuance of any of the license types, or
about what will happen to Stage-One approvals, previously granted,
when zoning or land use applications are mired in local zoning and
land use hearings or appeals processes extending beyond the one year
Stage-Two processing period. Without adequate guidance from the
Commission or the State generally, the burden of establishing effec-
tive zoning and land use regimes for medical cannabis facilities has
been left up to the local governments to handle (as has been the case
traditionally), on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.
Ethical Perspectives for Maryland Counsel
Maryland lawyers have been practicing under the Maryland Law-
yers’ Rules of Professional Conduct since they became effective Janu-
127. Id.
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ary 1, 1987.128 At least two rules, Rule 1.2(d)129 and Rule 8.4(b)130, are
directly relevant to would-be counsel to marijuana industry partici-
pants.  The first prohibits a lawyer from counseling or otherwise assist-
ing a client in engaging in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent; the second states that it is misconduct for a lawyer to
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. The Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct are based on the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted
by 49 states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.  Accord-
ingly, lawyers in each state (other than California which has not
adopted the Model Rules) with some form of legalized marijuana in-
dustry have to deal with the implications of Rule 1.2(d) and Rule
8.4(b).
A sizable number of state bar associations have yet to address the
issue,131 leaving attorneys in those states without any practical gui-
dance or assistance in approaching the conflict between federal and
state laws as respects state-sanctioned marijuana-related activities.
Those state bar associations which have addressed the topic have gen-
erally adopted three approaches.
The first approach has been to apply Rule 1.2(d) strictly, that is, to
prohibit lawyers from assisting clients engaged in marijuana-related
businesses as long as the conduct continues to violate federal law. To
date, the only state with legalized marijuana to take this position has
been Maine.132
128. 2 The Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct, Appendix.
129. MD R ATTORNEYS Rule 19-301.2 (d) (quoting “A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning
or application of the law.”).
130. MD R ATTORNEYS Rule 19-308.4 (b) (quoting “It is professional miscon-
duct for a lawyer to: . . .Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects”).
131. Infra chart, STATE BAR POSITIONS ON LEGALIZED MARIJUANA.
132. Opinion #199. Advising clients concerning Maine’s Medical Marijuana Act,
BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR: STATE OF MAINE, Jul 7, 2010, http://
www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134. The
Pennsylvania bar has taken a similar position (Paul Kazaras, Philadelphia and
Pennsylvania Bars Weigh In on Propriety of Providing Advice to Marijuana Related
Businesses, UPON FURTHER REVIEW, Oct.26, 2015, https://uponfurtherre-
view.philadelphiabar.org/page/Article?articleID=caceb2c4-f23c-4669-96b6-
5fc4d018b980.), even though Pennsylvania has not legalized medical or
recreational marijuana.  The opinion was issued in response to inquiries
from Pennsylvania Bar members about the propriety of providing legal ser-
vices to clients interested in engaging in activities that are subject to an-
other state’s marijuana laws or in preparation for the possible legalization
of medical marijuana in Pennsylvania.
122 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 5
The second approach, adopted by the Florida and Massachusetts
Bars, has been to grant immunity to lawyers from disciplinary action
for assisting clients engaged in marijuana-related businesses. The Flor-
ida Bar Board of Governors and the Massachusetts Board of Bar Over-
seers and the Office of Bar Counsel have issued identical statements
that they “will not prosecute a. . . Bar Member solely for advising a
client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of [state] statutes
regarding medical marijuana or for assisting a client in conduct that
the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by the [state] statutes, reg-
ulations, orders, and other state or local provisions implementing
them, as long as the lawyer also advised the client regarding related
federal law and policy.”133
The third, adopted by the largest number of states that have consid-
ered the issue allows lawyers to represent clients engaged in marijuana
related businesses, provided that they also advise on related federal
law and policy.134 Maryland joined this group on February 29, 2016,
when the Maryland State Bar Association’s Committee on Ethics135 re-
leased Ethics Docket No. 2016–10 (the “Maryland Opinion”), which
addressed the question whether the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit attorneys from advising clients seeking to engage in
conduct pursuant to Maryland’s Medical Marijuana Laws.  The Com-
mittee also addressed whether the Rules prohibit Maryland attorneys
owning an interest in medical marijuana businesses. The Maryland
Opinion examined the extraordinary landscape surrounding medical
marijuana laws and policy coupled with federal acquiescence in state
authorization of marijuana,136 and observed that an attorney’s ethical
obligations are unclear.
133. Board of Bar Overseers/Office of Bar Counsel Policy on Medical Marijuana,
MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/marijuana.pdf.
134. Infra chart, STATE BAR POSITIONS ON LEGALIZED MARIJUANA.
135. The Maryland State Bar Association has a standing Committee on Ethics,
with a mandate derived from Article VII of the MSBA Bylaws to provide
interpretations of ethics rules covering lawyers and judges in Maryland.
The Committee on Ethics has published written opinions interpreting the
Maryland ethics rules since 1978.  These opinions, while having no prece-
dential effect, have become a resource to which Maryland lawyers fre-
quently resort. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gregory, 311 Md.
522, 531-32, 536 A.2d 646, 651 (1988) (stating MSBA ethics opinions are
advisory only and therefore not binding on the court, but may be helpful
before the Attorney Grievance Commission “where reasonable reliance
upon an Ethics Opinion on point. . . is likely to have a significant effect.”).
The Committee can issue an opinion on its own initiative, on the request of
a member of the Bar, a professional organization, a Court, or upon a re-
quest from a member of the public.  In response, formal analyses are pre-
pared by volunteer lawyers serving on the Committee.  Prior opinions of
the Committee are indexed and available online via the Bar Association’s
website, www.msba.org).
136. See DOJ Memoranda, supra notes 49-56.
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With some carefully crafted caveats, the Committee concluded that
Maryland attorneys are not prohibited under the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct from advising clients as to medical marijuana
business related activities in Maryland, or providing legal services such
as contracting or negotiating to advance such projects. The Commit-
tee also determined that Maryland attorneys are not prohibited by the
Rules of Professional Conduct from owning a business interest in such
ventures. Acknowledging that its opinions are advisory only, the Com-
mittee observed that it would be beneficial for the Court of Appeals
(assuming it is in agreement with the Maryland Opinion) to amend
the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct137  to reflect the ethical
nature of assisting in or conducting business activities under the
MMM Laws.138
Regarding these caveats, the Committee first noted the unique na-
ture of the federal/state conflict, and cautioned that the Maryland
Opinion should not be extrapolated to any other context. Next, it ob-
served that the Committee’s position is largely predicated on the as-
sumption that the federal government’s position, as reflected in the
DOJ Memoranda, would remain unchanged, and if the Justice Depart-
ment altered its stance then the Committee’s views might well change.
The Committee carefully noted that the Maryland Opinion is not le-
gal advice, and that it does not immunize lawyers from disciplinary
actions or prosecution by authorities with such powers. The Commit-
tee then further observed that the Local Rules of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland contain rules contemplating poten-
tial attorney discipline before the federal bar for violations of ethical
obligations, and warned that the Committee’s position may not neces-
sarily be acknowledged and observed by the federal bar.139
137. Several states have modified their ethics rules to address the federal/state
conflict posed by legalized marijuana (e.g., Colorado and Connecticut).
Under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 13-301, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has authority to appoint a standing committee to assist the Court
in the exercise of its rulemaking power to regulate Maryland courts. The
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, referred to sim-
ply as the Rules Committee, meets regularly to consider proposed amend-
ments and additions to the Maryland Rules and to submit
recommendations for change to the Court of Appeals. Currently, it is not
considering any Rule changes to accommodate the matters discussed here.
138. The actual text of the Opinion in its last paragraph references “Maryland’s
Medical Malpractice Law. Presumably it was intended to reference “Mary-
land’s Medical Marijuana Law.”
139. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the inherent power of the federal
district courts to disbar or discipline attorneys before them. In re Snyder,
472 U.S. 634, 642-45, 105 S. Ct. 2874, 2879-82, 86 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1985)
(providing that the federal court has an inherent authority to suspend or
disbar an attorney).  On November 17, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado announced an amendment to its local rules that argua-
bly will preclude members of the U.S. District Court Bar there from repre-
senting marijuana related businesses.  The U.S. District Court opted out of
a comment to Rule 1.2(b) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct,
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The Maryland Opinion offers much-needed guidance for Maryland
lawyers, but it suffers from some shortcomings. First, and most impor-
tantly, the Maryland Opinion does not state whether a lawyer may buy
marijuana for personal use under the MMM Laws. Several states have
issued guidance on whether Rule 8.4(b) (criminal acts reflecting ad-
versely on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice) would bar a lawyer
from purchasing or using marijuana,140 but the Maryland Opinion is
silent on this point.
Next, the Maryland Opinion offers no guidance for Maryland law-
yers in deciding whether to accept an engagement, or in setting terms
specific to an engagement to offer counsel in connection with MMM
Law-sanctioned activities.  For example, many ethics opinions provide
that a lawyer may not undertake an engagement to advise a client
about a state’s medical marijuana laws, or to represent a client and
assist it in state-sanctioned marijuana-related business activities, unless
the lawyer first fully advises the client that such activities may violate
federal laws, including the CSA. The Maryland Opinion does not re-
quire this.
So while the guidance contained in the Maryland Opinion is help-
ful, it is incomplete.141 With that in mind, Maryland lawyers who are
considering whether to accept an engagement to advise and assist a
client in MMM Law-related activities would themselves be well advised
to adopt some of the following “best practices” in order to support a
satisfying and straight-forward attorney-client relationship:142
which allows Colorado attorneys to assist clients with conduct permitted
under the Colorado marijuana laws.  The U.S. District Court rule would not
allow attorneys to “assist a client in conduct that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves is permitted by” Colorado’s marijuana laws.  This creates a significant
split in the ethical rules applicable to state and federal practitioners in Col-
orado. See Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov et. al., New Federal Ethics Rules Precludes
Colorado Attorneys Practicing in U.S. District Court From Assisting Clients in Com-




140.  See, e.g., Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Opinion No.
23 (April 6, 2015); Washington State Bar Association Advisory Opinion
201501 (June, 2015).
141. Exposure to federal criminal prosecution and possible state bar sanctions
aside, a lawyer is well advised to insure that his malpractice insurance cover-
age will not be jeopardized by accepting an engagement to represent a
state-sanctioned marijuana-related business participant. See, Debra Cassens
Weiss, Lawyer Loses Malpractice Insurance Because She Represents Medical Pot Cli-
ents, ABA JOURNAL, May 8, 2012, http://www.abajournal.com/news/arti
cle/lawyer_loses_malpractice_insurance_because_she_represents_medical_
pot_clien/.
142. See generally Steven Schain, Marijuana Law: Protecting Your Client and License,
CANNABIS BUSINESS EXECUTIVE, May 17, 2016, https://www.cannabisbusin
essexecutive.com/2016/05/16593/.
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• Add written warnings on federal law in engagement let-
ters, websites and written memoranda for marijuana
clients.
• Perform a background check on each individual involved
with the client. This would include criminal and financial
background checks.
• Use marijuana-specific engagement letters that clearly de-
tail the risks and also include language:
○ Advising the client to comply with state law.
○ Advising the client about the risks of prosecution
under federal law and potential consequences associ-
ated with violations of federal law that may be practice
specific.
○ Advising the client that because aspects of its pro-
posed business likely violate federal law, it may have
difficulty developing banking relationships. Counsel
would be well advised to consider whether it will ac-
cept cash payments for its fees and expenses in con-
nection with the engagement, or whether it will insist
that its proposed client make other arrangements so
that counsel can be assured of being paid through
regular banking channels. Counsel should carefully
consider the possibility that it may have to accept pay-
ment of its fees in cash, and consider whether it is
comfortable with that. In that case, the engagement
letter should specifically advise the proposed client
that, depending upon the amount of cash paid to
counsel, counsel will be required to obtain from the
client certain information that the client may deem
confidential, and that counsel may in turn be re-
quired to disclose such information to banking regu-
latory participants. In that case the client should
specifically consent to provide counsel with such in-
formation and agree that counsel is authorized to dis-
close such information in connection with its own
banking relationships.
○ Reserving the lawyer’s right to withdraw from the rep-
resentation if the client acts in a ways that invite fed-
eral prosecution, or that violate state law, or that
subject counsel to disciplinary proceedings or sanc-
tions before any state or federal bar.
○ Advising the client of the possible limitations on con-
fidentiality and the attorney-client privilege in the
event of civil or criminal litigation.
Other practice-specific engagement letter limitations, disclosures
and disclaimers may be appropriate depending on the scope of the
prospective engagement.  Some of the more obvious limitations might
include advice and caution that MMM Law related activities may jeop-
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ardize a client’s ability to seek federal bankruptcy protection, or to
deduct business expenses under the Internal Revenue Code, or to ob-
tain federal trademark protection.143 Also, thought should be given as
to whether to require a personal guaranty from each owner for fees, as
is routinely requested in engagement letters for representing startup
companies.
The MMM Laws signal the growth and development of a new and
potentially lucrative new industry in Maryland; and these laws present
significant opportunities for Maryland lawyers. Given the number of
growing, processing and dispensary facilities to be licensed, it is likely
that many Maryland real estate lawyers will face the ethical issues dis-
cussed here. So far, the trend among the state bar associations has
been to liberalize the ethical rules, or, at a minimum, to accommo-
date interpretations of these rules in order to allow attorneys to assist
clients engaged in marijuana-related businesses. In Maryland, we now
have some helpful guidance, even if limited or incomplete. The legal
landscape in this area is rapidly shifting under foot, so practitioners
will need to remain nimble and diligent so as not to stumble.
STATE BAR POSITIONS ON LEGALIZED MARIJUANA
STATE DATES STATUS
Alaska June 23, 2015 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Rule 1.2 was amended to add new paragraph (f)
stating that “[a] lawyer may counsel a client
regarding Alaska’s marijuana laws and assist the
client to engage in conduct that the lawyer
reasonably believes is authorized by those laws.  If
Alaska law conflicts with federal law, the lawyer
shall also advise the client regarding related
federal law and policy.”  Alaska also added new
Comment [5] to Rule 8.4 stating that “[a]lthough
assisting a client under Rule 1.2(f) may violate
federal drug laws, it is not a violation of Rule
8.4(b).”
Arizona February 2011 Allowed by Opinion with Certain Requirements
The State Bar issued Ethics Opinion 11-01 stating
that lawyers may counsel or assist a client in
conduct permissible under state marijuana laws,
subject to three conditions:  (1) at the time the
advice or assistance is provided, no court has
ruled that the state marijuana law is preempted,
void or otherwise invalid; (2) the lawyer
reasonably concludes that the client’s conduct
complies with state law; and (3) the lawyer advises
the client about the possible federal
143. See, e.g., Olive v. C.I.R., 792 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that a
San Francisco marijuana dispensary was precluded from taking a business
expense deduction under the Internal Revenue Code because it is a “trade
or business. . . consists [ing] of trafficking in controlled substances. . . pro-
hibited by federal law”); In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 848 (10th Cir. BAP
(Colo.) 2015), supra note 47; In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799,
804 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012), supra note 77.
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STATE DATES STATUS
consequences, or recommends that the client
seek other legal counsel regarding those issues.
June 2015; Allowed by Opinion in two local jurisdictions, withCalifornia
August 12, 2015 Certain Requirements
The Bar Association of San Francisco issued
Opinion 2015-1 stating that a lawyer may
represent a client in forming and operating a
marijuana dispensary even though the lawyer may
thereby aid and abet violations of federal law.
However, the lawyer “should also advise the client
of potential liability under federal law and
relevant adverse consequences and should be
aware of the attorney’s own risks.”
The Los Angeles Bar Association Professional
Responsibility and Ethics Committee issued
Opinion No. 527 stating that laws may advise or
assist clients provided that the lawyer “does not
advise the client to violate federal law or assist the
client in violating federal law in a manner that
would enable the client to evade arrest or
prosecution for violation of the federal law.”
Further, the scope of representation must be
limited to “exclude any advice or assistance to
violate federal law with impunity” and advise the
client regarding the violation of federal law and
potential penalties.
Colorado March 24, 2015; Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements; but
November 17, 2015 Prohibited by Federal Bar
Rule 1.2 was amended to add new Comment [14]
stating that “[a] lawyer may counsel a client
regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of
Colorado constitution article XVIII, [Sections] 14
& 16, and may assist a client in conduct that the
lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by these
constitutional provisions and the statutes,
regulations, orders, and other state or local
provisions implementing them.  In these
circumstances, the lawyer shall also advise the
client regarding related federal law and policy.”
On November 17, 2015, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado amended its local
rules and opted out of Comment 14, so that
practitioners in the U.S. District Court will be
permitted to advise clients regarding the “validity,
scope, and meaning” of Colorado’s marijuana
laws, but they may not “assist a client in conduct
that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted
by” such laws. See D.C.COLO.LAttyR 2.   This
creates a significant split in the ethical rules
applicable to state and federal practitioners and
also arguably precludes members of the U.S.
District Court Bar from representing marijuana-
related businesses.
Connecticut January 1, 2015 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Connecticut revised Rule 1.2 to add new
subparagraph (d)(3) stating that “a lawyer
may. . .counsel or assist a client regarding
conduct expressly permitted by Connecticut law,
128 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 5
STATE DATES STATUS
provided that the lawyer counsels the client about
the legal consequences, under other applicable
law, of the client’s proposed course of conduct.”
The Commentary states that subsection (d)(3) “is
intended to permit counsel to provide legal
services to clients without being subject to
discipline under these Rules notwithstanding that
the services concern conduct prohibited under
federal or other law but expressly permitted
under Connecticut law.”
Florida May 23, 2014 Immunity from Disciplinary Action, Provided Client
also Advised on Federal Law
The Florida Bar Board of Governors issued
statement that they “will not prosecute a. . .Bar
member solely for advising a client regarding the
validity, scope, and meaning of [state] statutes
regarding medical marijuana or for assisting a
client in conduct that the lawyer reasonably
believes is permitted by [state] statutes,
regulations, orders, and other state or local
provisions implementing them, as long as the
lawyer also advised the client regarding related
federal law and policy.”
Hawaii October 20, 2015 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Hawaii revised Rule 1.2 to add new language to
subparagraph(d) stating that a lawyer “may
counsel or assist a client regarding conduct
expressly permitted by [Hawaii] law, provided
that the lawyer counsels the client about the legal
consequences, under other applicable law, of the
client’s proposed course of conduct.”
Illinois October 15, 2015 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Illinois revised Rule 1.2 to add new subparagraph
(d)(3) stating that a lawyer may “counsel or assist
a client regarding conduct expressly permitted by
Illinois law that may violate or conflict with
federal or other law, as long as the lawyer advises
the client about that federal or other law and its
potential consequences.”   New Comment [10]
was also added stating that subparagraph (d)(3)
“was adopted to address the dilemma facing a
lawyer in Illinois after the passage of the [state’s
marijuana laws].”
Maine July 7, 2010 Prohibited by Opinion
In Ethics Opinion 199 (July 7, 2010), the Maine
Professional Ethics Commission concluded that
Rule 1.2(d) “forbids attorneys from counseling a
client to engage in the business of medical
marijuana distribution or to assist a client in
doing so.”   Further, the Commission noted that
“[w]here the line is drawn between permitted
and forbidden activities needs to be evaluated on
a case by case basis” and that “participation in this
endeavor by an attorney involves a significant
degree of risk which needs to be carefully
evaluated.”
Maryland February 29, 2016 Allowed by Opinion with Certain Requirements
Maryland State Bar Association, Inc.’s Committee
on Ethics released Ethics Docket No. 2016-10
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which concluded that, subject to certain
limitations, the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct “[d]o not prohibit attorneys from
advising and assisting medical marijuana
businesses by providing legal services to advance
the business’s interests and to ensure compliance
with Maryland’s statutory regulation scheme, nor
do they prohibit ownership of such ventures by
attorneys.”  Suggests that the Court of Appeals
amend the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct to reflect the ethical nature of assisting
in or conducting business activities under
Maryland’s Medical Marijuana Law. Does not
address attorney possession or use of medical
marijuana.
Massachusetts June 1, 2014 Immunity from Disciplinary Action, Provided Client
also Advised on Federal Law
The Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and
the Office of the Bar Counsel adopted policy
identical to Florida, stating they “will not
prosecute a. . .Bar member solely for advising a
client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning
of [state] statutes regarding medical marijuana or
for assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer
reasonably believes is permitted by [state]
statutes, regulations, orders, and other state or
local provisions implementing them, as long as
the lawyer also advised the client regarding
related federal law and policy.”
Minnesota April 6, 2015 Allowed by Opinion with Certain Requirements
The Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board issued Opinion No. 23
stating that “[a] lawyer may advise a client about
the Minnesota Medical Marijuana Law and may
represent, advise and assist clients in all activities
relating to and in compliance with the Law,
including the manufacture, sale, distribution and
use of medical marijuana, without violating the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, so long
as the lawyer also advises his or her client that
such activities may violate federal law, including
the [CSA].”
Nevada May 7, 2014 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Nevada revised Rule 1.2 to add new Comment [1]
stating that “[a] lawyer may counsel a client
regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of
Nevada Constitution Article 4, Section 38, and
NRS Chapter 453A, and may assist a client in
conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is
permitted by these constitutional provisions and
statutes, including regulations, orders, and other
state or local provisions implementing them.  In
these circumstances, the lawyer shall also advise
the client regarding related federal law and
policy.”
New York September 29, 2014 Allowed by Opinion with Certain Requirements
The New York State Bar issued Ethics Opinion
1024 stating that “[i]n light of current federal
enforcement policy, the New York Rules permit a
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lawyer to assist a client in conduct designed to
comply with state medical marijuana law,
notwithstanding that federal narcotics law
prohibits the delivery, sale, possession and use of
marijuana and makes no exception for medical
marijuana.”
Oregon February 19, 2015 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Oregon amended Rule 1.2 to add new subsection
(d) stating that “a lawyer may counsel and assist a
client regarding Oregon’s marijuana-related laws.
In the event Oregon law conflicts with federal or
tribal law, the lawyer shall also advise the client
regarding related federal and tribal law and
policy.”
Pennsylvania144 October 2015 Prohibited by Opinion
The Ethics Committees for the Pennsylvania and
Philadelphia bar associations issued Joint Formal
Opinion 2015-100 stating that, as currently
written, Rule 1.2(d) “forbids” a lawyer from
counseling or assisting clients in the marijuana
industry by “drafting or negotiating contracts for
purchase, distribution or sale of marijuana.”
However, the Committees have recommended
that Rule 1.2(d) be amended to authorize lawyers
to “counsel or assist a client regarding conduct
expressly permitted by the law of the state where
it takes place or has its predominant effect,
provided that the lawyer counsels the client about
the legal consequences, under other applicable
law, of the clients’ proposed course of conduct.”
Washington November 6, 2014 Allowed by Rule with Certain Requirements
Washington amended Rule 1.2 to add new
Comment [18] stating that “[a]t least until there
is a change in federal enforcement policy, a
lawyer may counsel a client regarding the validity,
scope and meaning of Washington Initiative
502. . .and may assist a client in conduct that the
lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by this
statute and the other statutes, regulations, orders,
and other state and local provisions
implementing them.”






144. Pennsylvania has not legalized medical or recreational marijuana.  The
opinion was issued in response to inquiries from Pennsylvania Bar
members about the propriety of providing legal services to clients
interested in engaging in activities that are subject to another state’s
marijuana laws or in preparation for the possible legalization of medical
marijuana in Pennsylvania
